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Abstract  
Information systems security is a challenging research area in the context of Information Systems. In 
fact, it has strong practical implications for the management of IS and, at the same time, it gives very 
interesting insights into understanding the process of social phenomena when communication  
information technologies are deployed in organizations. Current standards and best practices for the 
design and management of information systems security, recommend structured and mechanistic 
approaches, such as risk management methods and techniques, in order to address security issues. 
However, risk analysis and risk evaluation processes have  their limitations, when security incidents 
occur, they emerge in a context, and their rarity and even their uniqueness give rise to unpredictable 
threats. The analysis of these phenomena which are characterized by breakdowns, surprises and side-
effects, requires a theoretical approach which is able to examine and interpret subjectively the detail 
of each incident. The aim of this paper is to highlight the duality of information systems security,  
providing an alternative view on the management of those aspects already defined  in the literature as 
intractable problems and this is pursued through a formative context (Ciborra, Lanzara, 1994) that 
supports bricolage, hacking and improvisation. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Despite the trend in IS security, research is moving away from the narrow technical viewpoint, the 
socio-organizational perspective in dealing with security issues is still at an early stage (Dhillon & 
Backhouse 2001). Several research efforts in the field of interpretive analysis face the lack of any 
prescriptive component, and the apparent lack of value to the security manager. On the other hand, 
approaches based on the measurement and control of variables, following the positivist methodology, 
demonstrates limitations when applied to social phenomena. In fact, the simplification and abstraction 
needed for good experimental design can remove enough features from the subject of study that 
renders only obvious results possible (Kaplan & Duchon 1988). 
In the IS domain, information security is a challenging research area. In fact it has strong practical 
implications for the management of Information Systems and, at the same time, it offers us very 
interesting insights into understanding the process of social phenomena when communication  
information technologies are deployed in organisations. Despite several research efforts that have been 
conducted within the academic community in order to understand which are the main issues in 
managing IS security, a prevalent part of the literature still refers to standards and best practices for the 
definition of concepts and methods to prevent, detect and react to computer incidents. This is in part 
due to the issues in developing theories, using widely accepted methods grounded in the positivist 
perspective, in a field where it is difficult to collate data in order to develop and test generalised 
solutions. Moreover, widely accepted structured and mechanistic approaches, such as risk 
management techniques, have proven to be limiting in their ability to predict computer incidents, 
especially those dependent on the behaviour of internal actors. 
From this perspective, the subdivision of threats into predictable and unpredictable threats seems 
fruitful. These diverse threats are disparate in nature, and are characterised by a duality. That is to say 
their management requires a different perspective to maintain the IS security. This duality is 
reinforced by the fact that the nature of the threats requires a specific epistemological approach. 
Predictable threats seem apt for being investigated through positivist approaches, whereas 
unpredictable threats lend themselves to interpretive approaches.  
The paper is organized as follows. Firstly, current approaches in the IS security management and their 
focus on predictable threats are introduced. An analysis of unpredictable threats follows, which will  
examine the limits of an integrated epistemological perspective. The concept of formative context is 
then presented as the instrument for outlining an organizational measure apt for managing these 
threats. A discussion of results and conclusions brings this paper to a close.  
COMMON APPROACHES TO IS SECURITY MANAGEMENT  
Information system security is often defined in the practitioners‟ literature as the protection of 
information systems against unauthorized access to or modification of information, whether in storage, 
processing or transit, and against the denial of service to authorized users or the provision of service to 
unauthorized users, including those measures necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats. 
The three widely accepted information security requirements are confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. Security administration is considered to be a management and not purely a technical issue. 
Therefore the establishment, maintenance and continuous updating of an Information Security 
Management System (ISMS) provides a strong indication that an organisation is using a systematic 
approach for the identification, assessment and management of information security risks. 
Furthermore, such a company will be capable of successfully addressing information confidentiality, 
integrity and availability requirements. 
In order to better understand the systematic approach to information security management, we need to 
introduce some of the concepts used by standards and best practices. Looking at standards, many 
models are available, especially within the quality management area, which describe the common 
stages for managing the security of information systems. For example the PDCA cycle, described in 
the quality management literature by Deming (1986), consists of the four stages: plan, do, check and 
act. This model is adopted by the ISO27001 standard (ISO/IEC 2005) to describe the process for 
establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving an 
organisation‟s Information Security Management System (ISMS). A similar structure, based on a 
cyclical sequence of stages, can be found in other methods for the management of IT systems (see for 
example the COBIT 2005 framework). In fact, the adoption of the PDCA model reflects the principles 
set out in the OECD Guidelines (2002) governing the security of information systems and networks. 
Focusing on each stage of the above mentioned model, we find two main classes of activities. Firstly, 
the evaluation activities performed by the management of IS security, which consists of both the 
assessment of the current information security situation (“plan”), and the review of risk assessment 
results (“check”), taking into account several change factors such as the effectiveness of the 
implemented controls, and external events, etc. This phase is related to the initial evaluation of IS 
security and to the review of the overall ISMS. Secondly, the activities performed by the organisation 
in order to implement and operate (“do”) and to maintain and improve (“act”) the ISMS (See figure n. 
1).   
 
Figure 1. Common stages of an ISMS 
Our attention will now concentrate on the management activities which are focused on the selection of 
security controls based on the results of the evaluation process performed in the organisation. In our 
opinion, the evaluation process, which is mainly based on a risk assessment approach, represents the 
most critical part of all these approaches based on this model and hence all of the widely accepted 
standard based approaches. 
In the description of the “Plan” stage of the ISO27001 standard, the definition of a risk assessment 
approach is required for the organisation. Moreover, the organisation should “identify a risk 
assessment methodology that is suited to the ISMS, and to the identified business information security, 
legal and regulatory requirements” (ISO/IEC 2005). Furthermore, the organisation should “develop 
criteria for accepting risks, and should identify the acceptable levels of risks”. This risk assessment 
methodology “shall ensure that risk assessment produce comparable and reproducible results”. The 
same standard defines risk assessment as the “overall process of risk analysis and risk evaluation”. 
Traditional risk assessment processes are designed to identify (1), analyse (2) and evaluate (3) threats 
and vulnerabilities in order to decide on the appropriate measures and controls to manage them. A 
detailed and updated description of risk management concepts and methods, has been published 
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recently by the ENISA Agency (ENISA, 2006). Here we summarize some of the information related 
to the three phases of the risk assessment process. During the identification phase (1), threats, 
vulnerabilities and the associated risks are identified. This process has to be systematic and 
comprehensive enough to ensure that no risk is unwittingly excluded. Methods and tools used to 
identify risks and their occurrence include checklists, judgments based on experience and records, 
flow charts, brainstorming, systems analysis, scenario analysis and systems engineering techniques. 
The risk analysis phase (2) involves a thorough examination of the risk sources, of their consequences 
and of the likelihood that those consequences may occur. Moreover, it involves the assessment of any 
existing controls or processes that tend to minimize negative risks or enhance positive risks. The level 
of risk can be estimated by using statistical analysis and calculations combining impact and likelihood. 
Information used to estimate impact and likelihood usually comes from past experience or data and 
records (e.g. incident reporting), reliable practices, international standards or guidelines, market 
research and analysis, experiments and prototypes, economic, engineering or other models, and 
specialist and expert advice. Risk analysis may vary in detail according to the risk, the purpose of the 
analysis, and the required protection level of the relevant information, data and resources. Analysis 
may be qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative or a combination of these. Finally, during the risk 
evaluation phase (3) decisions have to be made concerning which risks need treatment and which do 
not, as well as focusing on the treatment priorities. Analysts need to compare the level of risk 
determined during the analysis process with risk criteria established in the context of risk 
management. 
Risk analysis is a well established technique with a long history. The limitations of risk analysis have 
been widely recognized for many years. In a recent work, Baskerville (2005) describes two intractable 
problems that limit the effectiveness of common risk analysis practices. These problems include the 
lack of reliable empirical data concerning the frequency and amount of losses attributable to 
information security compromises, and the relative rarity of many kinds of information security 
compromises. In fact, the collection of incident data is often collated after the incidence with 
questionable thoroughness and accuracy. Moreover, managers consider this data extremely sensitive 
and highly confidential. Therefore, there is very little motive for any organization to disclose data 
regarding the costs and frequency of information security compromises. The second intractable 
problem in information security risk analysis is related to the invalidity of probability arithmetic where 
the attacks are uniquely targeted, and of a relatively low frequency (i.e. insider fraud). However, the 
ability to communicate to general management the expert opinions concerning an organization‟s 
information risk profile in terms of threats and safeguards, is often recognized as the best risk analysis 
characteristic (Baskerville, 1991). 
THE NATURE OF UNPREDICTABLE THREATS 
In order to study the IS security phenomenon, an analysis of the nature of information systems is 
considered a prerequisite. Only from a deep understanding of the role of information and 
communication technology (ICT) in the organizational life can it throw light on the different aspects 
that determine security. Moreover, this technology is playing an ever-increasing role in organisations: 
intra- and interorganizational coordination, knowledge sharing, standardization of business practices 
are simple examples of some organizational objectives reached through a large implementation of 
ICT. 
Enterprise systems (Gosain, 2004) and information infrastructures (Ciborra, Hanseth, 2000) outline an 
organizational scenario in which the role of ICT is pervasive. A scenario where business functions are 
tightly integrated, and the database is shared due to an enterprise system and where the notion of 
information infrastructures represents the integration of equipments, systems, applications and 
processes, at a corporate level, supporting people managing information and communications. This 
differs from the past, these systems and infrastructures connect multiple communities of practice 
whilst traditional systems tend to support a single community of practice.  
From this perspective, ICT can be seen as an instrument capable of profoundly restructuring the 
organizational background. Practices and communications, the structure of organizational 
relationships and economic transactions can be completely redesigned. Nevertheless, the result of this 
organizational redesign is not easy to predict. Established practices and the presence of informal 
practices and rules based on a continuous evolutionary process interact with technical systems 
characterized by an immense range of actions. Therefore, the end result of the implementation process 
of these systems is an open issue, subject to varied and subtle factors (Chae, Lanzara, 2006).  
The notion of drift has been introduced in order to further investigate these factors (Ciborra, 2002). 
Drift represents a phenomenon that can affect both technologies and processes when the result of an 
implementation process of a technological system does not match the original design. Two diverse, but 
at the same time intertwined dynamics are at the source of this phenomenon. On the one hand, the 
openness of the technology to the eventual re-inventions employed by users, and the unforeseeable 
technical interdependences based on the overlapping of old (legacy) and new platforms or on different 
standard interferences. On the other hand, actors, through unexpected interventions, tinkering and 
improvisations, can outline a new way of technology adoption. 
According to this understanding, the term evolution does not seem appropriate to define this 
phenomenon. Evolution suggests an idea of a linear process of adoption, but this is not so in the case 
of enterprise systems and information infrastructures. Surprisingly, user resistance, and the eventual 
effective functioning of legacy systems and learning processes caused by the introduction of such 
innovation are elements that contribute to outlining an out of control scenario where surprises, 
inventions, obstructions, opportunistic behaviours and vicious circles give way to multiple forms of 
implementation according to different circumstances. 
Moreover, Ciborra (2004) maintains that ICT is increasingly substituting the user‟s reality and life. 
Indeed, users entrust this technology in order to transform aspects of life like concern and care into a 
resource that can be formalated and calculated. However, formalizations and calculations can be 
considered the springboard for further concern that may require further formalizations and calculations 
and so on. Inherent in this discourse are the disruptive and potentially hazardous events that are not 
understood within the sphere of the formal knowledge related to the technology. The role played by 
ICT enables it to be engaged in courses of action that involve a higher level of uncertainty. To sum up, 
this is another side effect produced by the introduction of this kind of technology that significantly 
affects the level of security. 
The objective of this digression is to throw light on the limits of risk analysis and risk evaluation for 
managing IS security. In this scenario, the above mentioned intractable problems emerge restricting 
the function of this analysis and evaluation: the lack of reliable empirical data regarding the frequency 
of losses, on the one hand, and the rarity of many kinds of these losses, on the other hand (Baskerville, 
2005). In a context described by a phenomenon like drift, the rarity and even the uniqueness of 
security compromised events are no longer an exception, and the traditional instruments of risk 
analysis such as arithmetic probability becomes inadequate. 
THE DUAL NATURE OF IS SECURITY 
Straub and Welke (1998) maintain that the main objectives of IS security planning should be to deter, 
prevent, detect and pursue remedies and/or punishing offenders for abuses. These objectives should 
drive the selection of technical solutions in the design phase of an information security management 
system. From their perspective, computer incidents play a passive role in the research process, they are 
considered to be an undesired phenomenon and, in some sense, a fatality - a scenario that should not 
happen but sometimes can take place. Here incidents acquire a different meaning. They can be seen as 
an indicator of what effectively is occurring in an organization. A resource to understand how 
technology is employed which can then reconsider the functionality of these systems, which is a ray of 
sunlight in the obscure mechanisms that characterize the adoption of complex technical systems. 
Therefore, we can claim that computer incidents should be one of the main phenomena under 
investigation in the context of IS security research. In fact, this phenomenon is related both to the 
unpredictable behaviour of actors involved in the information system, and to the openness of 
technology.  
From this perspective, new elements emerge. If users‟ unpredictable behaviours are examined, 
computer incidents in organizations can be considered strongly related to the subjective understanding 
of human actors interacting with a set of technical, formal and informal rules which are composed of 
the implemented Information Security Management System (ISMS) and the more general information 
system. Losses in confidentiality, integrity and availability of data and communications, are at the 
centre of compromises in which organizational actors are the protagonists due to malicious or 
involuntary behaviours. One of the objectives of an ISMS is to reduce the risks that are represented by 
the notion of computer abuse and computer misuse. The former is intended as the malicious violation 
of formal or informal rules which regulate the use of technical systems in order to gain a personal 
tangible or intangible benefit. The latter is the violation of the same set of rules without the intentional 
consequences of the security of the information system. In our opinion, both kinds of computer 
incidents are extremely valuable for the IS researcher. 
According to this understanding, a duality of IS security can be taken into consideration. On the one 
side, security has to face the incident issue. That is, those events that are produced by unpredictable 
users‟ behaviour due to both the nature of technology under examination, and the possibility of 
unforeseen practices. On the other side, security is constituted by a protection system against 
predictable threats. Breakdowns and other problems can be recurrent or identifiable.  
COMBINING INTEPRETIVISM AND POSITIVISM: LEE’S 
INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 
The dual nature of security poses a problem for analysis. Is it possible to study a phenomenon so 
ambivalent to its method? Furthermore, which method simultaneously allows us to investigate the 
purely objective and recurrent threats, and which method allows us to investigate those unpredictable 
threats based on a specific situation? This twofold nature of IS security requires us to accept the 
existence of different levels of understanding when dealing with human behaviour. 
In order to introduce a possible solution for demonstrating the feasibility of such a opinion, we present 
in this section an integrated framework proposed by Lee (1991) in the context of organisational 
research. We also apply the following three levels of understanding, defined in the framework, to 
concepts related to IS security: 
 
 the subjective understanding, consists of everyday meanings and common sense notions in which 
observed human subjects see themselves and the organizational world around them; 
 the interpretive understanding, consists of the organizational researcher‟s reading or interpretation 
of the subjective understanding, developed with the help of such methods as phenomenological 
sociology, hermeneutics, ethnography, and participant-observation; 
 the positivist understanding, consists of theoretical propositions, manipulated according to the rules 
of formal logic and hypothetical-deductive logic, so that the resulting theory satisfies the 
requirements of falsifiability, logical consistency, relative explanatory power, survival. These 
theoretical propositions are not about people, but “puppets” which are supposed to think and act 
like the observed human subjects. 
The cyclical relationships among these three levels of understanding is illustrated in the next figure. 
 
  
 
Figure 2. The integrated framework (Lee, 1991). 
 
Arrows 1 and 2 represent the construction (1) and test (2) of the interpretive understanding performed 
by researchers through qualitative methods (i.e. phenomenological sociology, hermeneutics, and 
ethnography). The objective here is to reach an interpretive understanding and to test the coherence of 
the interpretation given to the subjective understanding of actors involved in computer incidents. In 
this phase the interpretive approach underlies an in depth analysis of computer incidents and 
contextual elements, based on data gathered from people, documents and computer systems (i.e. logs, 
files, etc.). The positivist understanding can then be developed on the basis of the results of the  
interpretive understanding and theoretical propositions are formulated in order to explain human 
behaviour. It is at this point that, Lee utilizes the Schultz‟ concept of “puppets” (1973), in order to 
adapt the positivist understanding to the social reality under investigation. This is carried out by the 
researcher who constructs puppets which are capable of thinking and acting like the observed human 
subjects. According to this aim, the researcher “endows the puppets with certain internally held values, 
specifies the variety of external opportunities  and constraints that the puppets may encounter in their 
environment, and specifies the actions (the publicly observable behaviours), with which the puppets 
given their internally held values, may respond to the externally encountered opportunities and 
constraints”. Arrows 3 and 4 refer to the formulation of theoretical proposition (3), using the rules of 
formal and hypothetico-deductive logic, and to the comparison (4) between the subjective meanings 
attached by human subjects to their actions and the subjective meanings assigned by researchers to the 
actions of the puppets. Finally, arrows 5 and 6 represent the predictions (5) and the 
confirmation/disconfirmation (6) of theoretical propositions through controlled empirical testing. 
Thus, human behaviours are predicted from the theory (5) and are tested (6) against actual behaviours, 
arising from the subjective understanding.  
The above mentioned framework belongs to the body of contributions which advocate the integration 
of largely positivist and interpretive approaches (Lee 1991, Gable 1994). In a recent work and 
referring to the more general field of IS, Björn & Carsten (2006) claim that the question of „paradigm 
incommensurability‟ regarding positivism and interpretivism must be seen as an open issue.  Based on 
a variety of different arguments, Landry & Banville (1992) demonstrate how these paradigms can be 
seen as different but compatible views on the same research subject, but also as intrinsically 
contradictory. The twofold perspective depends on different definitions of positivism and 
interpretivism. The first viewpoint states that positivism and interpretivism feature distinct 
epistemological assumptions, but share the (ontological) „real world‟ assumption. As a consequence of 
this perspective, interpretivism and positivism do not lead to different paradigmatic views on IS, but 
they do analyze IS differently. Also Orlikowski & Baroudi (1991) claim that “from the viewpoint of 
3 
6 
1 
5 
4 
2 
The 
subjective 
understanding 
The 
Interpretive 
understanding 
The 
positivist 
understanding 
weak constructionism, interpretive research is understood to complement positivist research, that is, by 
generating hypothesis for further investigation, by filling in the positivist knowledge gaps the 
positivist research cannot attend to, such as the contextual exigencies, the meaning systems, and the 
interaction of various components of a systems”. From Lee‟s perspective, this integrated approach 
allows us to test both the validity of the positivist understanding, and of the interpretive understanding 
in a mutually supportive collaboration. Furthermore, this mutually supportive collaboration can also be 
conducted by different researchers across different studies.  
PREDICTABLE AND UNPREDICTABLE THREATS: REVISITING 
LEE’S INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 
The fact that the Lee‟s approach tries to integrate the subjective understanding, the interpretative 
understanding and the positivist understanding can be of some help to us to investigate the IS security 
phenomenon according to its dual perspective. The reason for this is based on the fact that the question 
of security, which is related to the incident issue, tends to fall into the sphere of the subjective and 
interpretative understanding for its interpretation whilst the question of security against predictable 
threats tends to fall into the sphere of the positivist understanding. Indeed, the motivation is intuitive. 
Considering the nature of ICT, the permeating role played by enterprise systems or information 
infrastructures and the possible reformulation of procedures and practices employed by users, 
incidents can be considered as emerging phenomena which are context related and unpredictable in 
nature. Therefore, the analysis of these phenomena requires a theoretical approach which is able to 
examine the specifics of each incident, and only a subjective and interpretative understanding permits 
such an analysis. This differs from the analysis and survey of predictable threats which requires a 
different instrument of examination. In this case, the positivist understanding is more fruitful, because 
of the recurrence of these events, the rules of formal logic and the rules of hypothetical-deductive 
logic seem more appropriate for their analysis.  
As it was mentioned above, Lee‟s approach consists of a cycle in which subjective and interpretative 
understanding are, in some sense, the engines of the positivist understanding. It is  crucial to have a 
solid base on which to build theories that acquire their validity identifying regularities through, for 
example, statistical instruments. Furthermore, the analysis of incidents can effectively contribute to the 
development of a positivist understanding, and this aspect is not neglected in this analysis. Risk 
assessment, for example, is based on this presupposition. Therefore, a determinate range of events 
becomes determinable (see figure n. 3 “clear side”).  
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 If the statistical incident analysis can be a source and identification of predictable threats, in some 
cases this could not happen. Following Baskerville (2005), it is possible to face intractable problems 
when the very nature of incidents is rare or even unique. Users‟ re-inventions and unforeseeable 
technical interdependences can determine short circuits, which are unpredictable and based on 
fortuitous events and pure coincidences.  
In this case, Lee‟s integrating approach is no longer viable. The cycle that sees the subjective 
understanding, the interpretative and the positivist understanding supporting each other in order to 
provide a comprehensive theoretical approach has limitations, as a positivist understanding of these 
phenomena is impractical. Nevertheless, the same approach suggests that this is in the circle of 
subjective and interpretative understanding and that an analysis of these kinds of incidents should take 
place. 
MANAGING UNPREDICTABLE THREATS: BRICOLAGE, HACKING 
AND IMPROVISATION 
In some parts of this analysis, it has been suggested that incidents are context related. This means that 
these events, at least as far as it concerns the human actors perspective, can originate from specific 
dynamics of a determinate sphere. All of this suggests that the focus of analysis should move, and in 
some cases the organizational level, used so far, is not appropriate. Authors like Suchman (1987) and 
Lave and Wenger (1991) have introduced the concept of situational action and the community of 
practice respectively. These concepts define an environment that is less loose in respect to that one 
identified by the term organization. They underline a series of characteristics that adhere to a stricter 
social entity because of the social learning processes, identity, and shared preconceptions etc. In this 
understanding the concept of formative context is going to be introduced.  
However, now, this concept will not be taken into consideration in order to investigate the reasons that 
cause a specific incident, but will focus on how these incidents can be prevented and managed. That is, 
what kind of interventions can be adopted, in this case, in order to reduce damages? Which 
organizational measures should be taken in advance for managing critical situations? Unger (1987) 
was the first to introduce this concept but this paper will seek to examine this concept‟s interpretation 
according to Ciborra and Lanzara (1994). The subjective and the interpretative understanding of the 
formative context is based on a twofold analysis that considers structural aspects and cognitive aspects 
as well. In other words, by formative context we mean the institutional instruments and mechanisms, 
and the cognitive images and presuppositions associated with them, that the actors bring to the 
organization and that they habitually use in action situations. For example, if the hierarchy is the 
formative context, it can be assumed, on the one hand, that there exists a specific division of labour 
inside a typical hierarchical organizational chart in which any member holds an established role 
(institutional arrangements), and on the other hand, it can also be seen as a way of reasoning, of 
solving problems and of executing tasks imbued with the hierarchy (cognitive frames), often without 
questioning the legitimacy of these actions. This means that the combination of institutional and 
cognitive aspects allows us to investigate the background, which often occurs without questioning the 
legitimacy of such an action, that influence both the individual subjects' interpretation of the different 
organizational dynamics and the routines and forms of coordination that characterize those dynamics.   
The objective, now, is to see if the concept of formative context can be of some help to face rare or 
unique incidents. In other words, which institutional arrangements and cognitive frames allows us to 
face, in some way, those incidents that, because of their very nature, are not predictable? Which 
countermeasures can be adopted in order to manage situations characterized by breakdowns, surprises 
and side-effects? Following Ciborra‟s work (1992), a formative context capable of managing these 
situations should characterize itself because of cognitive and institutional structures that challenge 
existing routines, and established ways of acting and behaving. A context where learning and 
innovation are favoured in respect to monitoring and control, where deviations and mismatches are 
seen as raw material for outlining new practices and where bricolage, improvisation, and hacking 
rather than formalization and pre-planned ways describe the mode of operation (see figure n. 3 “dark 
side”). 
Particularly, the terms bricolage, improvisation, and hacking may describe some characteristics of this 
formative context. Bricolage represents the capacity to tinker with the resources available. A group of 
elements are combined according to the needs of a specific context contributing to new ways of acting 
where technology and practices can be re-interpreted. Improvisation underlines the vision, the quick 
glance in which the situation appears, all of a sudden, under control and propitious for acting. 
Extemporaneity, suddenness and unpredictability characterize improvised human interventions. 
Hacking has acquired a negative meaning. However, in this case, it is not take on a negative 
connotation. Hacking can be considered as the ability to implement a specific programme of a 
common function in a creative and unusual way. What is considered important to underline about 
hacking is the fact that these interventions fit with the larger application environment even though 
technology is used according to improper modalities. If the term bricolage is more apt for outlining the 
intervention of organizational procedures, for example, hacking concerns the field of software 
engineering. Software programs are reinterpreted and used in an unorthodox way leading to new 
solutions. Moreover, hacking activities tend to develop in a different community from the environment 
in which software engineering is built up, where a clear division of labour between analysts, and 
application programmers etc. exists. 
The hacker community introduces a characteristic of formative contexts that support bricolage, 
improvisation and hacking. Institutional arrangements and cognitive frames, in this case, are highly 
situated and shared by a minority that acts within the parameters of organizational systems. Only in 
this environment do interventions acquire the sense of timing and touch of the connoisseur. This does 
not mean that this community should be impervious to its surrounding environment. On the contrary, 
its contamination with new cultures and ideas, collaborations and cooperative undertaking can give 
rise to learning and other related innovations. 
To sum up, bricolage, improvisation, and hacking may, in a paradoxical way, represent some 
countermeasures against unpredictable incidents. The development of a formative context that support 
these activities can constitute a significant part of IS security management. 
DISCUSSION 
The question of the management of predictable and unpredictable threats has already been investigated 
by Baskerville (2005) in his work “Information Warfare”. Specifically, he underlines that fundamental 
assumptions and premises distinguish the thinking not only in the business environment, but also in 
the information warfare environment. In fact, he proposes both a business and warfare paradigm. The 
former assumes that risks are predictable, measurable and persistent and they should be managed on 
the basis of the probability theory, quality improvement and an exploitation type of organizational 
learning rather than an exploration one (March, 1991). On the other hand, the latter assumes that risks 
are both unpredictable (not measurable) and transient and managed on the basis of the possibility 
theory, the agility theory and an exploration type of organizational learning rather than an exploitation 
one. 
The perspective proposed in this paper is not dissimilar from Baskerville‟s one. However, in this case, 
rather than outlining of a paradigm related to information systems security in the business environment 
and in the information warfare environment, an epistemological issue emerges. That is, a research 
activity based on positivist approaches seems more apt for investigating instruments to manage 
predictable threats and a research activity based on interpretive approaches seems more apt for 
investigating instruments to manage unpredictable threats. This means that the diverse nature of 
threats seems to require a diverse epistemological approach. To sum up, whereas Baskerville‟s 
perspective focuses on the construction of a paradigm on the basis of the different environment in 
which the security issue emerges, here, the crucial point is the nature of the threats, which are 
indifferent from the environment in which they take place and the adoption of an appropriate 
epistemological approach for their management.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper provides a discussion on the duality of information systems security, where the main issue 
for the management has been identified in facing both a set of predictable threats and a set of emerging 
and context related intractable problems. In the first case, a number of methods and techniques are 
available with the objective of reducing risks through the selection of appropriate countermeasures at a 
technical and procedural level. For the second class of problems, the adoption of a new approach has 
been envisaged, based on the development of a subjective and interpretive understanding of actions 
surrounding human behaviour. According to its aims, the concepts of formative context have been 
presented and new elements such as bricolage, improvisation and hacking have been added to the 
traditional ISMS model. These elements should provide additional capabilities to management in 
respect to the well structured and formalized techniques based on monitoring and control. The 
assumption is that, in order to manage situations characterized by breakdowns, surprises and side-
effects, it is impossible to evaluate the risks and to define an effective action plan. In this context, the 
ability to develop a formative context where learning and innovation are favoured, can force  
management to establish a more secure environment in their organizations.  
This work also has implication for the IS researcher, in fact computer incidents reveal themselves to 
be an interesting phenomenon to focus on. Therefore, the development of a body of knowledge in 
which computer incidents are thoroughly investigated, for instance, through action research projects 
can dramatically increase the understanding of social phenomena and lead to the definition of new 
interpretative frameworks.  
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